Wednesday, 3 September 2025

EU citizenship to get “thicker”: a case note on a public hearing

 



Jeremy Bierbach: lawyer, Franssen Advocaten; associate, Amsterdam Centre for European Law and Governance

Photo credit: Cedric Puisney, via Wikimedia Commons


Introduction

 

In Eric Stein’s groundbreaking 1981 article on the then-Court of Justice of the European Communities, “Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Constitution”,[1] he wrote:

 

Tucked away in the fairyland Duchy of Luxembourg and blessed, until recently, with benign neglect by the powers that be and the mass media, the Court of Justice of the European Communities has fashioned a constitutional framework for a federal-type structure in Europe.

 

But the Court is now consciously stepping out from its traditional hermitage to give greater exposure to its role in upholding the rule of law in the European Union, at a moment in time when courts in many legal systems are increasingly being called on to rule on the permissibility of governments’ attempts to limit citizens’ rights. 

 

On 25 March 2025, a remarkable hearing took place before the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union. That I can even write about it is thanks to the Court’s introduction of a video streaming service, as of 26 April 2022.[2] While hearings involving oral pleadings before the Grand Chamber are not streamed live, they are made available with a delay (starting later on the same day), and remain available to view for an entire month after the hearing (as of 1 October 2024).[3] The streaming service has ingeniously patched audio streams of all of the languages of the EU over the video— or at least all of the languages for which interpretations are available, including the language of the case, just as if the viewer is sitting in the courtroom and turning the dial to select the audio for her or his earpiece. The Court’s most recent expansion of the streaming service was based on a conscious decision, with the imprimatur of the Council,[4] to increase the transparency of the Court’s workings and make the content of hearings, not just the Court’s own publications, available for academic analysis. 

 

The preliminary reference in Safi: background

 

I will hereby present the most interesting points that I transcribed from the hearing while it was available.[5]The language of this case, named Safi (a pseudonym for the plaintiff), was Dutch, because it concerned a preliminary reference from a district court in the Netherlands. At stake is the proper interpretation of Article 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which (with relatively minor differences from the current formulation) had been introduced as Article 17 of the EC Treaty with the Treaty of Maastricht founding the European Union in 1993 (current formulation below) :

 

1.   Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship.

 

2.   Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights and be subject to the duties provided for in the Treaties. They shall have, inter alia:

 

(a)

the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States;

 

(b)

the right to vote and to stand as candidates in elections to the European Parliament and in municipal elections in their Member State of residence, under the same conditions as nationals of that State;

 

(c)

the right to enjoy, in the territory of a third country in which the Member State of which they are nationals is not represented, the protection of the diplomatic and consular authorities of any Member State on the same conditions as the nationals of that State;

 

(d)

the right to petition the European Parliament, to apply to the European Ombudsman, and to address the institutions and advisory bodies of the Union in any of the Treaty languages and to obtain a reply in the same language.

 

These rights shall be exercised in accordance with the conditions and limits defined by the Treaties and by the measures adopted thereunder.

 

It is clear from the content of the streamed hearing in Safi (in which the Conclusion of Advocate-General Ćapeta will be issued on 4 September 2025, and the Court’s judgment can be expected sometime around the beginning of 2026), that Safi will be a very momentous judgment on Article 20, which can be said to represent the most idealistic norm of what EU citizenship is destined[6] to be. 

 

Safi will be the latest judgment in a saga on rights of residence for third-country national parents of young EU citizens (in those young EU citizens’ own member states of nationality), based on Article 20, that began with Ruiz Zambrano,[7] then continued with Rendón Martin,[8] and most recently the judgments on preliminary references from Dutch courts Chavez-Vilchez,[9] E.K.[10] (as a ruling on whether an Art. 20 right of residence is ‘temporary’ in the sense of Art. 3(2)(e) of the Long-Term Resident Directive, 2003/109) and X. v.Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid (also known as Mère thaïlandaise d’un enfant mineur néerlandais).[11] 

 

The reason for the prominence of preliminary references from Dutch courts is that the Dutch government has consistently sought out the innermost boundaries of as stingy as possible an implementation of the Court’s case law on Art. 20. After Ruiz Zambrano, in which the third-country national father of a young Belgian child (whose mother was also a third-country national) was deemed to have a right of residence in Belgium based on Art. 20, the Dutch government considered that third-country national parents of young Dutch children would only have a right of residence if the other (inevitably Dutch national) parent was dead or otherwise incapacitated to care for the child alone. The Court put paid to that interpretation in Chavez-Vilchez, in which it ruled that denial of a right of residence to the third-country national parent, in cases where the Dutch parent was theoretically capable of caring for the child alone, but where the child was also dependent on the third-country national parent, would also mean that the child “be compelled to leave the territory of the European Union as a whole and thereby deprived of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred on him by” Art. 20, taking into consideration Art. 24(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the rights of the child.

 

The Court’s judgment in Mère thaïlandaise, in turn, was spurred by a preliminary reference on the Dutch government’s claim that the doctrine did not apply when the child (who in this case lived in Thailand with his grandmother) did not already reside in the Netherlands, or even in the EU. In this case, as well, the Court was compelled to complete the rather obvious syllogism that the right not to be compelled to leave the territory also implied a right not to be effectively denied access to the territory of the European Union by not be ensured of accompaniment by a third-country national parent on whom the child is dependent, and also further ruled on the significance of Art. 24(2) Charter.[12]

 

The preliminary reference in Safi was engendered by the Dutch government’s latest attempt to apply the Court’s case law as literally as possible. Ms. Safi (the Court’s pseudonym for the plaintiff) is the Moroccan mother of a young Dutch child, claiming a right of residence in the Netherlands, together with the child and her Dutch husband, based on Art. 20. However, she is in the possession of a permanent residence permit in Spain. Therefore, the Dutch government claims, her child would not in fact be compelled to leave the territory of the European Union as a whole; the child and his father can make use of Art. 7 of Directive 2004/38 (based on their right of freedom of movement, Art. 21(1) TFEU) to move to Spain, where the family could be intact.

 

Ms. Safi claims, on the other hand, that this would be anything but in the interests of the child: her son has language and learning disabilities and is currently receiving special education in his Dutch school. To be forced to go to a Spanish primary school in a completely new language would hinder his development even more. Moreover, her husband is unable to work and lives on a disability benefit, so he would be unlikely to be able to legally reside in Spain as a ‘worker’ on the basis of Art. 7 Directive.

 

The hearing

 

The Danish agent at the Court, as the representative of the only other member state to intervene, expresses support for the Dutch government’s standpoint. But the Dutch agent at the Court, responding to these arguments at the hearing, gives a rather hapless impression. The viewer would suspect that the baseline intransigence of all of the last five Dutch governments, when it comes to an unwillingness to generously interpret Art. 20 TFEU, is now amplified by the fact that the Dutch agent is being instructed by a civil servant (seated next to him) who is presumably representing the defendant, the Minister of Asylum and Migration, at the time Marjolein Faber-van de Klashorst of Geert Wilders’ hard-right Freedom Party (PVV).[13]

 

The agent appears to be unable or unwilling to respond to the A-G’s and the judges’ questions with compelling arguments based on EU law and the Court’s own case-law. In particular, his repeated insistence that the Dutch government’s decision to deny Ms. Safi’s application was in conformity with EU law because it ensured that the right to family life, based on Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, would not be infringed (because the family could be intact in Spain), seems to arouse barely concealed irritation on the part of the Advocate-General when she is questioning him.  She goes on to ask, as to the substance of Art. 20 as established in Ruiz Zambrano (at 1h23m), why the child’s Art. 20 rights would be violated if he was compelled to move to Morocco, in the Dutch government’s view, but not if he was compelled to move to Spain. The Dutch agent can only speculate, in response (1h26m), that it might be more difficult for the child to move back to the Netherlands from Morocco in the future than it would be for the child to make use of freedom of movement to move back from Spain to the Netherlands or another member state. 

 

Turning to the Commission, the A-G asks, among other things (1h27m): “Article 20... says that the citizens of the Union shall enjoy the right to move and reside within the territory of the member states. Do you think that this might have any influence in this case? I mean, is the minor who is forced to move to another member state because his mom is not given the derived right of residence residing or moving "freely"?”

 

The agent of the Commission responds (1h28m, speaking Dutch, my transcription of the English interpreter): “If the child is forced to move to a member state where the child cannot live in a way that's compatible with his best interests and the right to family life, then that of course is not "free movement".”

 

Even more revealing were the questions and comments of the judges, first of all Vice-President Von Danwitz directly asking the agent of the Dutch government (speaking in French, my transcription of the English interpreter, 1h31m): “Now, we're getting the impression somewhat, or I'm afraid that I could get the impression, that here what is trying to be done is to take something that in my mother tongue is called "schwarzen Peter spielen". In other words, you want to avoid the social burden by passing the buck in relation to this particular family. Now, just before, you said that the Dutch authorities had concluded that in fact, in Spain, the family could live autonomously. They would be able to provide for their own subsistence. But if the Netherlands were to grant a right of residence to the mother of the child concerned, the mother would be able to start working again and could potentially allow the family to make ends meet. So the same trajectory that you suggest would be possible in Spain. So why doesn't such an option exist in the Netherlands?”

 

President Lenaerts immediately adds the clarification (speaking in Dutch, 1h34m, my translation): “May I be more blunt? The Dutch father now lives from a social benefit in the Netherlands. If the family is deported to Spain, then that benefit would no longer be paid out. That might create the impression that the Netherlands is dumping its social burden on another member state.”


Later on (1h41m), Judge Jürimäe, visibly irritated at an evasive answer provided by the agent of the Dutch government: 'Yes, but we just established that this is about the child and his Article 20 [Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union] rights, in conjunction with the Charter, and you [the Netherlands] are avoiding that issue in these proceedings. I'm talking about the rights of the child.'

Later on (1h43m): Judge Jääskinen: “Why are we having this case here? Does the Netherlands legislation include residence permits for the family members of Dutch citizens? ... I think in many member states you normally give a residence permit to the spouse or family member of a citizen, but in your member state, you have something more complicated.”

 

Later on (1h51m), in response to the agent of the Dutch government once more insisting, in response to the judge’s questions, that it can be assumed that the family would be able to be go together to Spain and there would thereby be no violation of art. 20 TFEU, Jääskinen says: “Doesn't this then mean, I refer to the ‘schwarzer Peter’ argument, that actually you are making an implied expulsion of your own citizens, you are counting that your own citizens are forced to leave because of the family circumstances?” 

 

President Lenaerts clarifies in Dutch (my own translation, improving on the English interpreter): “Judge Jääskinen’s question is in relation to what the Netherlands has pointed out: the Netherlands is expecting two of its own nationals, the father and the son, to leave the Netherlands, their own country of nationality, all to get rid of the mother.” 

 

Analysis

 

The Advocate-General’s Conclusion on 4 September, judging from the hearing, promises to be interesting. The questions that she can be expected to come to grips with are:

 

Whether an EU citizen (any EU citizen) can effectively be compelled to make use of freedom of movement based on Art. 21(1) from her or his own member state of nationality to a host member state, or if Art. 20 TFEU prohibits this. Then the following question would be when such a prohibition would be triggered:

 

-          with regard to young EU citizen children, when the rights of the child based on Art. 24(2) Charter are not taken into account; or

-          with regard to adult EU citizens, if the citizen in question is dependent on social assistance in his or her home member state and is unlikely to be able to satisfy the conditions set in Art. 7 Directive 2004/38 of being a worker, being self-employed or having sufficient resources.

 

As to the last subquestion: Vice President Von Danwitz’s question and President Lenaerts’s qualification of it were in fact quite revealing of this angle, which had probably not been envisaged by the parties in their own submissions. But their questions possibly foreshadowed the Court’s judgment Commission v. Malta,[14] which was handed down less than two months later, on 29 April 2025. In that judgment, the Court ruled that Malta’s citizenship by investment programme, by which the nationality of Malta, and therefore also EU citizenship, could be obtained in exchange for a nearly negligible period of actual residence and a substantial investment, violated Art. 20 TFEU and Art. 4(3) TEU, the principle of sincere cooperation. 

 

The Court thereby ruled that Art. 20 TFEU was not merely a Treaty right that is of interest for individuals, but that it also has a dimension relating to the interests of the member states severally, considering that the grant of nationality in one member state gives the holder access to freedom of movement in the entire Union. If one member state grants its nationality too easily, therefore, the movement of those newly minted EU citizens could be seen as noxious to the other member states.[15]  Critics of the judgment claimed that this meant that EU citizenship was being made to be “thicker”, in terms of setting substantive conditions for the grant of member state nationality.[16]

 

But it seems that the Court could rule in a similar vein that it is equally in violation of the principle of sincere cooperation for a member state to compel the movement of its own nationals to a host member state where they will potentially become a burden; therefore Art. 20 TFEU militates in favour of a right to remain in one’s own member state, where access to social assistance is unlimited.

 

It is the individual interests of the Union citizen that will be most augmented by the judgment on Art. 20 TFEU that is to be expected. It is perhaps not accidental that Ms. Safi and her child are (Dutch-) Moroccan, members of a heavily stigmatized minority in Dutch society. Geert Wilders, the leader and sole member of the PVV party that the defendant minister of the Dutch government served on behalf of, was in fact convicted on hate-speech charges in 2014 for making a promise to deport people (citizens and non-citizens alike) from Moroccan backgrounds.[17] In light of the final quote from President Lenaerts cited above, it certainly looks like the minister’s interpretation of EU law aimed to serve that very goal. Therefore, Art. 20 TFEU could serve as a key backstop against member states attempting to ‘alienize’ and effectively deport their own nationals; indeed providing a ‘thickness’ in terms of basic civil rights that EU citizens’ own member states’ legal systems may be lacking.

 


[1] E. Stein, ‘Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Constitution’ (1981) 75 The American Journal of International Law1–27.

[2] https://eucrim.eu/news/new-streaming-service-at-cjeu-website/#:~:text=Since%2026%20April%202022%2C%20citizens,the%20delivery%20of%20the%20judgments.https://www.politico.eu/article/eus-top-court-embraces-digital-age-with-streaming-service/

[3] President of the Court Koen Lenaerts, in an interview with Prof. Katerina Linos, at 1h25mhttps://podcasts.apple.com/nl/podcast/cjeu-episode-2-european-union-court-of-justice/id1592768751?i=1000675376975&l=en-GB

[4] In the words of President Lenaerts himself, supra n. 3

[5] I previously presented them on 10 May 2025 at the conference of the European Union Studies Association, Panel 10L, in Philadelphia.

[6] ECJ Rudy Grzelczyk v Centre public d’aide sociale d’Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve (2001), vol. C-184/99. “Union citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States, enabling those who find themselves in the same situation to enjoy the same treatment in law irrespective of their nationality, subject to such exceptions as are expressly provided for.”, par. 31.

[7] https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-34/09

[8] https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&jur=C,T,F&num=c-165/14

[9] https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=nl&num=C-133/15

[10] https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-624/20

[11] https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-459/20

[12] For a critical note, however, see Harvey D. The Best Interests of the Child Need Not Necessarily be a Primary Consideration: ECJ 22 June 2023, Case C-459/20, X v Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid (Mère thaïlandaise d’un enfant mineur néerlandais). European Constitutional Law Review. 2024;20(4):569-592. doi:10.1017/S1574019624000397 https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-constitutional-law-review/article/best-interests-of-the-child-need-not-necessarily-be-a-primary-consideration/B0A6F9C4D7496110F50E2D9357967914?utm_campaign=shareaholic&utm_medium=copy_link&utm_source=bookmark

[13] The PVV withdrew all its ministers from government on 3 June 2025 over its insistence that the other coalition parties were not doing enough to put an immediate stop to asylum-related migration to the Netherlands, causing the government to collapse and go into caretaker mode; new elections for the lower house of Parliament will be held on 29 October 2025.

[14] https://curia.europa.eu/juris/documents.jsf?num=C-181/23

[15] I am consciously referencing the considerations of James Madison, Federalist 42, in favor of what became the unified rules for naturalization in the United States.

[16] https://verfassungsblog.de/eu-citizenships-new-essentialism/

[17] https://www.economist.com/europe/2025/08/28/after-a-year-of-chaos-the-dutch-hope-to-return-to-real-issues?giftId=0a5ba70a-777c-4d03-95b8-5c73bfa185a0&utm_campaign=gifted_article


Monday, 1 September 2025

The judgment of the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union on the Italy-Albania Protocol

 


 

 

Matteo Zamboni (human rights lawyer working between Italy and the UK. He is a partner to the Immigration Law and Policy clinic of Goldsmiths, University of London)

Photo credit: Shëngjin Port in Albania, the location of one of the two detention centres built by Italy © Albinfo, CC BY 4.0 via Wikimedia Commons


 

Introduction

 

On 1 August 2025, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) published its judgment in joined cases C-758 and 759/24 (Alace and Canpelli) regarding the Italy-Albania Protocol, and more specifically the designation of safe countries of origin under Article 37 of EU Directive 2013/32 (the currently applicable asylum procedures Directive). In previous blogs on the public hearing of 25 February 2025 and the opinion of the Advocate General (AG) of 10 April 2025, I gave some information on the context of the case and its high political stakes at Italian and European level. Indeed, the plan is not only critical to the political capital of the Italian government but also admired by foreign heads of government, including the UK Prime Minister, and taken as an example (or a ‘general rehearsal’) by the President of the EU Commission.

 

On this latter point, it is probably worth repeating that, while the present case was pending before the CJEU, the EU Commission:

 

-          changed its position on whether, under Directive 2013/32, Member States have the power to designate a country as a ‘safe’ country of origin with the exclusion of ‘clearly identifiable categories of persons’, by first denying this possibility in its written pleadings of (where it was argued that ‘Directive 2013/32 does not allow for the designation of a third country as a safe country of origin where a significant number of persons belonging to the same category are systematically persecuted or face a risk of suffering serious harm […]’) and then admitting in the oral arguments made at the hearing (to the surprise of the President of the Grand Chamber);

-          adopted a proposal on the idea of “return hubs” located outside the European Union, with a move that mirrors the legislative amendment enacted by the Italian government while awaiting the decision of the Grand Chamber (with decree-law no 37 of 28 March 2025) to use one of the two centres built in Albania (the one in Gjader) as a return hub to detain individuals whose claims to international protection had been rejected and who are awaiting deportation; and

-          published a proposal for amendments to Regulation 2024/1348 (the asylum procedures Regulation, applicable from June 2026) which would, among other things: (i) create a European Union-level list of ‘safe countries of origin’, including Bangladesh, the country of origin of the real individuals behind the fictitious names of Alace and Canpelli; (ii) bring forward the possibility, for Member States, to apply the new provisions allowing to designate a country of origin as ‘safe’ in spite of the existence of ‘specific regions’ and/or ‘clearly identifiable categories of individuals’ for which the country is, in fact, not safe.

 

The extreme salience and significance of the case is equally witnessed by the intervention of 16 Member States that, like the Commission, endorsed the position of the Italian Government. It is no surprise, then, that the news that the judgment of the Grand Chamber granted all of the arguments made by the defence on behalf of the asylum seekers concerned was met by a strong reaction in the media and from the Government. As a matter of fact, in a long tweet posted on the day of the judgment, the Italian President of the Council of Ministers, Giorgia Meloni, accused the Court of Justice to ‘claim[…] powers that do not belong to it’ by ‘decid[ing] to delegate to any national judge the decision not on individual cases, but on the part of migration policy relating to the repatriation and expulsion of illegal immigrants’.

 

The tweet (which is very long and available here) betrays the disappointment for the considerable difficulties and drawbacks in the enforcement of the scheme. As denounced by the Italian watchdog for the region of Lazio, who visited the centres on 30 July 2025 with his counterpart for the city of Rome, just before the judgment, the centres accommodated an ‘extremely limited number of people’ (27) which could easily be detained in the available places in the Italian structure. Against this background, one could think that the CJEU judgment would mark the end of the scheme; but this would probably be too optimistic. In fact, the CJEU did neither ban the conduct of asylum procedures in Albania, nor delved deep into the many human rights concerns inherent in the extra-territorial processing of asylum claims, which have been already highlighted in the legal literature, and to some extent already referred to the CJEU for further consideration with an order of the Italian Court of Cassation of 29 May 2025-20 June 2025 (no 23105).

 

So, while this ruling is certainly ‘another blow to a key aspect of the Italian government's migration policy’, it will most likely not be the final one. Instead, as reported in the press, from the day following Meloni’s reaction on Twitter some of her ministers are already changing their tune, saying that the CJEU judgment is actually good, because it explains to the Italian government the changes to be enacted to (finally!) activate the centres in Albania.

 

Summary of the judgment

 

The judgment focusses on the designation of safe countries of origin (SCOs), which, as explained by Judge Jürimäe, bears far-reaching consequences for asylum seekers. It triggers the application of the accelerated examination procedure and the operation of the (rebuttable) presumption that no protection is needed. The question for the Grand Chamber of the CJEU, then, was which national authority has the final say over the designation of a country as ‘safe’ under Article 37 of Directive 2013/32 and whether a country can be considered as ‘safe’ in spite of the existence of exceptions for vulnerable categories. These questions are interesting from the point of view of EU law, since, as it has been noted, the CJEU has dealt with the issue only in one prior case; i.e., the judgment of 4 October 2024 in case C-406/22 (CV), regarding the designation of a country as ‘safe’ despite the existence of territorial exception (more specifically, the case was concerned with the designation of Moldova as a SCO by the Czech Republic with the exception of the region of Transnistria). Therefore, from a general perspective, a new (and clarificatory) intervention from the Luxembourg judges was much needed.

 

However, in the specific circumstances of the Italy-Albania Protocol, the question is even more critical, as it is precisely the designation of the country of origin of an asylum seeker as ‘safe’ that allows the deportation to the centres in Shengjin and Gjader  - and ultimately the operation of the whole scheme.

 

Under the applicable legislation (the Protocol of 6 November 2023, as integrated by the Standard Operation Procedures of the Ministry of the Interior, and the ratification law no 14 of 21 February 2024), prior to the amendments enacted by decree-law no 37 of 28 March 2025, passed into law no 75 of 3 May 2025, the requirements for deportation and detention into the centres in Albania were:

 

-          the fact that a ‘migrant’, as defined by Article 1(d) of the Protocol, is intercepted by the Italian navy on the high sea (see Article 4(4) of the Protocol; paras 4-6 of the SOPs; Article 3 (2) of law no. 14/2024, which makes explicit reference to ‘persons taken aboard Italian authority vessels outside the territorial waters of the Republic or other Member States of the European Union, including as a result of rescue operations’);

-          the consideration that the person concerned does not belong to one of the vulnerable categories established by law (i.e., women, non-accompanied minors, individuals affected by clear pathological conditions, elder people - see para 1 of the SOPs); and

-          the assessment that the asylum seeker comes from a country designated as a SCO (see para 6 of the SOPs). 

 

In terms of the domestic legal system, the latter requirement stems from Article 3(3) law no 14/2024, which equalises the centres in Albania to the border and transit areas provided for by legislative decree no 25 of 28 January 2008. This is the legislation that Italy passed to implement Directive 2005/85 on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status (the previous asylum procedures Directive), and that was then amended and integrated to transpose Directive 2013/32 and further EU legal instruments regarding asylum procedures. Among many other things, this legislation established a list of SCOs (at Article 2-bis, as amended by Article 1 of decree-law no. 158 of 23 October 2024) and stated that the request for international protection filed by individuals coming from one of such countries can be dealt with under the accelerated procedure (see Article 28-bis).

 

Moreover, Article 3(4) law no. 14/2024 states that the centres in Albania are to be considered as equivalent to the reception centres established by Article 10-ter(1) of legislative decree no. 286 of 25 July 1998; i.e., the so-called ‘special crisis centres’ in which are detained the ‘foreign nationals who are tracked down while crossing internal or external borders illegally, or who arrive on national territory following rescue operations at sea’. In terms of EU law, basically Italy relied on the designation of SCOs under Article 37 Directive 2013/32 to trigger the accelerated procedure under Article 31(8)(b) of that Directive and considered that the examination of the asylum request from the centres in Albania would be equal to the border procedure provided by Article 43 of the same directive. Therefore, the designation of the country of origin of the migrants concerned as a SCO is the necessary preliminary point for the operation of the entire scheme, including deportation to and detention in the centres in Albania.

 

The questions referred to the CJEU

 

For the sake of clarity, it is worth restating that the questions referred to the CJEU by the Tribunal of Rome in November 2024 concerned whether EU law, and in particular Articles 36, 37, and 39 of Directive 2013/32, interpreted in the light of Article 47 of the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights (‘the Charter’),

-          prevents Member States from designating SCOs by means of legislative instruments (acts of Parliament);

-          requires national legislation to publish the sources relied on for the designation of a specific country as a SCO;

-          allows national judges called to review the designation of SCOs to use information from sources other than those referred to in directive 2013/32; and

-          precludes a non-EU country from being designated as a SCO where there are categories of people for whom the substantive conditions for such a designation laid down in Annex I to directive 2013/32 are not met.

 

The answers of the Grand Chamber

 

At the outset, the 15 Judges assessed the admissibility of the request for referral, reminding that, according to settled case-law, ‘questions on the interpretation of EU law referred by a national court […] enjoy a presumption of relevance’ and can be refused ‘only [i] where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, [ii] where the problem is hypothetical, or [iii] where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it’. Clearly, in the mind of the Grand Chamber, none of these instances applied to the case at hand, which, on the contrary, raises questions of interpretation of Directive 2013/32 highly relevant for the solution of the case (see judgment § 38-41 with reference to the judgment of 19 December 2024 in cases C-185 and 189/24 (Tudmur) § 26)

 

The first question and the issue of disapplication

 

On the first question, the Grand Chamber followed the argument advanced by all the parties at the hearing, including the defence, and by the AG in his opinion, stating that the term “legislation” contained in Article 37(1) of Directive 2013/32 is to be interpreted in a wide manner; and that neither Article 37 nor other provisions of Directive 2013/32 sets out the specific national authority competent for the designation or the specific legislative instrument to be used for that purpose (ibid § 56 and 59-60). Finally, the Court reminded that, under Article 288(3) TFEU, Member States enjoy a margin of discretion when implementing directives (ibid § 61). So, the Court concluded that nothing prevents a Member State from issuing a list of SCOs by means of an act of Parliament.

 

At the same time, albeit acknowledging that, as stressed by the Italian Government and by all the intervening Member States, EU law leaves discretion to States when issuing the list of SCOs, the Court clarified that said discretion does neither affect (i) ‘the obligation […] to adopt all the measures necessary to ensure that the directive concerned is fully effective”, nor (ii) ‘the duty of the national judge to give full effect to the provisions of Directive 2013/32, including by dis-applying as required, of its own motion, any national rule, even if adopted subsequently, which is contrary to a provision of EU law with direct effect, without it having to request or await the prior setting aside of that national rule or practice by legislative or other constitutional means’ (ibid § 62 with reference to the judgments of 10 April 1984 in case C-14/83 (von Colson and Kaman) § 15 and of 31 March 2022 in case C-472/20 (Lombard Lízing) § 53; § 63 with reference to the judgments of 9 March 1987 in case C-106/77 (Simmental) § 21 and 24, and of 28 January 2025 in case C-253/23 (ASG 2) § 90).  

 

This argument was compounded by the reference to the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial, enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter. Indeed, the Court quoted from the precedent of case C-406/22 and held that

 

‘Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as meaning that, where an action is brought before a court or tribunal against a decision rejecting an application for international protection, examined in the context of the special scheme applicable to applications lodged by applicants from third countries designated, in accordance with Article 37 of that directive, as safe countries of origin, that court or tribunal must, as part of the full and ex nunc examination required by Article 46(3) of that directive, raise, on the basis of the information in the file and the information brought to its attention during the proceedings before it, a failure to have regard to the material conditions for such designation, set out in Annex I to that directive, even if that failure is not expressly relied on in support of that action’ (ibid § 66 with reference to case C-406/22 § 98)

 

On this basis, the Grand Chamber concluded that the fact that a Member State decided to designate SCOs by means of an act of Parliament, while not in itself contrary to Article 37 of Directive 2013/32 or any other EU law provision, cannot prevent the national judge to “check” (“controllare”) the designation, or “subject [it] to judicial control” (“oggetto di un controllo giurisdizionale”), on the basis of the substantive requirements set out in Annex I to the directive (ibid § 66 and 67 for the answer to the question).

 

The second and the third question on the right to access to the sources used for the designation of SCOs

 

As regards the second and the third question, the Court recognised that, while it lists a series of sources that need to be taken into consideration (namely, ‘information from other Member States, EASO, UNHCR, the Council of Europe and other relevant international organisations’), Article 37(3) of Directive 2013/32 does not expressly set out that the national authorities are under the obligation to publish and make accessible the sources used for the designation of SCOs (ibid § 70-71). Still, the Court followed the ‘systemic’ approach indicated by the AG in his opinion and applied a three-fold argument to reach the conclusion that (i) ‘the Member State designating a third country as a safe country of origin must ensure sufficient and adequate access to the sources of information referred to in Article 37(3) of [the] Directive’ and (ii) ‘the national judge […] may, if it verifies, even incidentally, whether such designation complies with the substantive conditions for such designation set out in Annex I to that Directive, take into account the information it has gathered, provided that, on the one hand, it ensures the reliability of that information and, on the other hand, it guarantees the parties concerned the right to be heard’ (ibid § 88).

In the first place, the Grand Chamber noted that the designation of a country as ‘safe’ triggers the operation of the presumption of sufficient protection in the country of origin of an asylum seeker. However, in order to guarantee the right to challenge and rebut the presumption, the asylum seeker must be put in the condition of knowing the reasons for the designation, including the sources employed by the national authorities’ (ibid § 72-73).

 

In the second place, the Judges underscored that Article 12(1)(d) of Directive 2013/32, read in combination with Article 10(3)(b), states that during the procedure regarding the examination of their claim, asylum seekers have a right to access ‘precise and up-to-date information […] from various sources, such as EASO and UNHCR and relevant international human rights organisations, as to the general situation prevailing in [their] countries of origin’. It, then, concluded that this information is basically the same as that referred to in Article 37(3). Moreover, under Article 10(4) of the directive, the national judicial authorities hearing an appeal against a decision of refusal of protection have access to the same information (ibid § 74-75).

 

In the third place, the CJEU relied - once again - on the right to fair trial, guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter, as a guide in the interpretation of Article 46 of Directive 2013/32, which set out the right to an effective remedy, reminding that, as it had already been stated in case C-406/22 and other precedents, the right to effective judicial protection resulting from the combination of these two provisions ‘is sufficient in itself and does not need to be made more specific by provisions of EU or national law in order to confer on individuals a right which they may rely on as such’ (ibid § 77 with reference to case C-406/22 § 86 and case law therein cited). That said, the Court remarked that effective judicial control presupposes that both the asylum seeker and the judicial authority must have full knowledge of the grounds of the decision of refusal (ibid § 78 with reference to the judgments of 4 June 2013 in case C-300/11 (ZZ) § 53 and of 29 July 2024, C-185/23 (protectus) § 79).

 

Yet, where a request for protection is denied as manifestly ill-founded since an asylum seeker comes from a ‘safe’ country, the reasons for the refusal overlap with the grounds to hold that the said country is indeed to be designated as ‘safe’ under Articles 36 and 37 and Annex I of Directive 2013/32 (ibid § 79). The ensuing conclusion that the asylum seeker and the national judge must have access to the sources and information relied on by the national authorities for the purpose of designating a country as ‘safe’ was further compounded by the literal interpretation of Article 46 of the Directive in the part that state that ‘Member States shall ensure that an effective remedy provides for a full and ex nunc examination of both facts and points of law, including, where applicable, an examination of the international protection needs pursuant to Directive 2011/95/EU […]’.

 

In this regard, with an argument that it had already employed in case C-406/22, the Court stressed that the expression ‘ex nunc’ indicates that the examination of the judicial authority has to include ‘new elements intervening after the adoption of the decision of refusal [of protection]’; that the adjective ‘complete’ means that the national judge has to examine ‘all the elements [that] […] have, or ought to have, been taken into consideration’ in the decision of dismissal of the claim; and that the clause ‘where applicable’ highlights that the process of judicial review ‘does not necessarily have to focus on the […] merits of the request for international protection’, rather ‘it could be concerned with the procedural aspects [of the claim] […] including the designation of a third country as a safe country of origin’ (ibid § 81-84 with reference to case C-406/22 § 87-91).  

 

The fourth question on the “personal exception” to the designation of SOCs

 

Finally, the Court held that Article 37 and Annex I of Directive 2013/32 prevent a Member State from designating a country as a SCO where the substantial conditions set out in Annex I to the directive are not satisfied for certain categories of persons. The conclusion ensues from an analysis of the letter of Article 37; the context of that provision in the framework of Directive 2013/32; and the objective of the EU legislation (ibid § 91).

 

To begin with, the Grand Chamber noted that nothing in the text of Article 37 suggests the terms ‘countries’ and ‘third countries’ may be interpreted as regarding just a portion of the population, even if this portion would be the majority (ibid § 92). This was confirmed by an analysis of the context of the directive, and specifically of the “substantive criteria” listed in Annex I. Here, the CJEU disagreed with the argument put forward by the AG and held that, in spite of ‘semantic differences’ in the official translations, the adverbs ‘generally’ and ‘consistently’ (in the English version of the directive) refer to a notion of ‘invariability’ (“invariabilità” in the Italian version of the judgment, ibid § 93-96). Moreover, the Court repeated that, as it had already stated in case C-406/22, all clauses of derogation and exceptional provisions need to be interpreted in a restrictive manner (ibid § 100).

 

It is perhaps worth noting that, in giving the interpretation of Article 37 in accordance with the literal and context-based approach, the Grand Chamber does not reference case C-406/22, although the same reasoning features in that judgment at §§ 65-71. On the other hand, case C-406/22 is explicitly quoted in the argument regarding the interpretation of Article 37 based on the objectives of Directive 2013/32. Indeed, §§ 101-106 of the Alace and Canpelli judgment replicate §§ 77-82 of case C-406/22. In both judgments, the Court stated, in essence, that the purpose of Directive 2013/32 is to ensure that, even under the accelerated procedure, asylum claims receive ‘adequate’ and ‘complete’ examination, in compliance with ‘basic principles and guarantees’, and that the presumption of safety of a country of origin remains ‘rebuttable’. In this context, the Court concluded that, when enacting Directive 2013/32, the EU legislature exercised its ‘discretion’ in order to ‘strike a fair balance’ between the need to speed up the processing of asylum requests and the duty to ensure that these are given full and fair examination. In the framework of this balancing exercise, the EU legislature decided ‘not [to] provide […] for the option for Member States to exclude certain categories of persons for the purposes of such designation’. Falling within the ‘prerogatives’ of the EU legislature, this choice of the balance point cannot be questioned by Member States.

 

The same applies to the decision as to the date of entry into force of the new Regulation 2024/1348, allowing, at Article 61(2), for the designation as a ‘safe country of origin’ with exceptions for specific parts of its territory or clearly identifiable categories of persons. Once again, the Grand Chamber held that the EU Legislature decided that the new legislation will only come into effect in June 2026 (ibid § 101-106).

 

As anticipated, this reasoning is exactly the same as the one developed in case C-406/22 concerning the so-called “territorial exception”. The only difference is that the Alace and Canpelli judgment contains (at § 107) a further reference to the proposal of the Commission entailing the amendments to Regulation 2024/1348 and the anticipation of the possibility, for Member States, to apply the new provisions regarding the designation of SOCs to ‘as soon as possible before June 2026’. Even this initiative is seen as an example of the exercise of legislative prerogatives by EU institutions, which, according to the CJEU, further reinforces the conclusion that – as the legislation currently stands under the realm of Directive 2013/32 – EU law does not allow for group exceptions in the designation of SCOs.

 

Conclusion

 

As noted, the CJEU gave priority to the case of Alace and Canpelli and suspended the examination of all the other questions referred by Italian judges, including on the designation of SCOs. Yet, it is not certain that the judgment of 1 August will clear all doubts surrounding the issue, and that, as a consequence, it would allow national judges to resolve the cases before them independent from further guidance from the Court.

 

This seems to be particularly true as far as the issue of disapplication is concerned. In fact, the Grand Chamber does not seem to answer in full to the argument, put forward by the Italian government, that the effective remedy available to the concerned asylum seeker to question, in general terms, the designation of a his or her country of origin as ‘safe’ is a challenge of constitutionality. By the same token, the Grand Chamber can be said to have failed to address the views of the Italian Constitutional Court in its most recent case law in this regard, as for example judgment no 181/2024, which introduced the concept of “constitutional tone”.

 

In the case, this view was supported by all the intervening Member States and the Commission with a more general argument aimed at underlying the difference between a general judicial review, which would involve the possibility, for the national judge, to question whether the designation of a country as ‘safe’ complies with the criteria laid down in Annex I of Directive 2013/32, and a more individualised assessment that the national judge will perform on whether the designation of a third country as a SCO does not apply to the individual(s) whose case is under examination, meaning that, for them and only for them, the country cannot be considered as ‘safe’. According to this argument, that in my opinion was best summarised at the hearing by the counsel for the German Government:

 

-          Directive 2013/32 distinguishes between the general designation of a country as a SCO, on the one hand, and the application of the concept in a specific case, on the other hand. The former assessment is based on general considerations, while the latter is based on the specific circumstances of the asylum seeker concerned.

-          Every national court has the power to perform the second assessment (application of the general designation of a country as a SCO to a specific case). However, the first assessment (general designation of a country as a SCO) must remain separate from this, and reserved to the Legislature. This is so because EU law leaves ‘leeway’ to Member States

-          If a national court believes that the general assessment that prompted the designation of a country as a SCO goes against the Constitution and/or EU law, it will have to raise a challenge of constitutionality before the constitutional court.

 

This was certainly taken into consideration by the AG in his opinion, which highlights the difference between a general challenge to the designation of a SCO and the decision, based on the specific circumstances of the case, that the designation does not apply to one or more individuals. This is probably the reason why, in his opinion, the AG never mentioned dis-application and rather chose to rely on the right to judicial protection (Article 47 of the Charter) and the right to an effective remedy (Article 46 of Directive 2013/32).

 

Against this backdrop, it seems as though the judgment does not really engage in these nuances. Indeed, the Grand Chamber refers to both dis-application and the right to an effective remedy when establishing that the national judge has the power to review the designation of a SCO. Yet, that part of the judgment may appear to be excessively straightforward. Indeed, the Court does not explicitly say that Article 37 and/or Annex I of Directive 2013/32 have direct effect, but merely implies this when referring to disapplication at § 63 of the judgment.

 

This omission is all the more apparent when considering that

 

-          the question as to whether Article 37 has direct effect was referred to the CJEU by the district Court of Bologna in case C-750/24 Ortega, but the Court suspended the examination of that request and gave priority to Alace and Canpelli;

-          in a different section of the judgment (at § 77) the Grand Chamber explicitly says that Articles 47 of the Charter and Article 46 of the directive have direct effect;

-          as I have already argued in my previous blog it does not seem too obvious that Article 37 qualifies as a provision of EU law capable of having direct effect on the basis of previous case law of the CJEU on the matter.

 

That said, it is also true that, leaving aside technicalities that may well be addressed in future cases, the answer of the Grand Chamber on the matter is clear: the need to ensure a full and fair examination of asylum claims at the European Union level requires that the national judge has the power to review each and every aspect of the request, including the designation of a country of origin as ‘safe’. In this sense, the judgment fits in the CJEU case law that has historically underscored the importance of the role of the national judge in the correct implementation of EU law.

 

The conclusion is the same as far as the answer to the fourth question is concerned, as it is indeed remarkable that the CJEU dismissed the “pragmatic” approach put forward by the Italian Government and resisted the “pressure” exerted by the intervening Member States and by the abrupt change of position of the Commission. The Grand Chamber also disavowed the opinion of the AG, which clearly favoured a loose interpretation of Article 37 and Annex I of Directive 2013/32, including on the basis of a questionable interpretation of the letter of the latter provision. Instead, the CJEU followed the defence, which had argued that ‘the letter of directive 2013/32, and especially its Annex I […] leaves no doubt as to the absolute impossibility to designate a country as a SCO whenever there are elements to hold that the country is, in fact, not safe for specific categories of people’. In so doing, it stressed the importance of the meaning of the hendiadys “generally” and “consistently”, saying that these terms require that the situation in a given country is “invariably” safe for its entire population.

 

Interestingly, while the reply to the first question can be read as a re-affirmation of the central role of the judiciary, the answer to the last question focusses on the prerogatives of the EU Legislature when exercising its discretion and striking a fair balance between the two conflicting objectives of Directive 2013/32; i.e. the interest to accelerate the examination of asylum claims vis-à-vis the duty to respect the basic rights of the asylum seekers.

 

For this reason, it seems to me that, rather than in terms of a conflict of powers (judiciary v executive) or institutions (EU v Member States), the judgment of 1 August 2025 should be read under the lenses of the tyranny of values. In this perspective, the issue is not as much which authority has the final say over an asylum claim, but whether, as a community based on the Rule of Law, the European Union and the Member States intend to place emphasis on pragmatic considerations regarding the burdensome effects of a large influx of asylum seekers, or whether the polar star is and remains the protection of fundamental rights - first and foremost the right to effective judicial protection.


Thursday, 28 August 2025

RFC Seraing v FIFA: Compulsory Arbitration, Judicial Review, and a move to Dublin?

 



Saksham Agrawal, student at National Law School of India University, Bangalore

Photo credit: Court of Arbitration for Sport in Lausanne, by Fanny Schertzer via Wikimedia Commons

 

Introduction

In its Grand Chamber judgment in RFC Seraing v. FIFA (‘RFC Seraing’), the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’) entered terrain historically defined by institutional restraint: the internal regulation of international sport. Yet the Court’s decision does not merely reinforce the primacy of Union law in a domain often cordoned off by arbitral exceptionalism; it articulates a principle of constitutional embeddedness for systems of private adjudication whose effects extend to protected market rights. The ruling demands that arbitration which is functionally mandatory and materially public, such as proceedings before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (‘CAS’), must remain permeable to fundamental guarantees embedded in the EU Treaties. Those guarantees include effective judicial protection, access to national courts, and interim relief (paras. 85–87, 91, 96).

The facts themselves are unremarkable. FC Seraing, a Belgian football club, entered into an economic rights agreement with Doyen Sports, a private investment firm. That arrangement ran afoul of FIFA’s regulatory framework prohibiting third-party ownership (‘TPO’), prompting sanctions which were subsequently upheld by the CAS (paras. 29-36). The applicants sought annulment of the CAS award before the Swiss Federal Supreme Court (‘SFSC’), which declined to intervene, and eventually was also disposed of by the Belgium Court of Appeal. (paras. 37-59). It was then brought in front of the Court of Cassation in Belgium, which then referred questions about the dispute to the CJEU. The CJEU found merit in their argument that the enforcement of the CAS award would contravene rights guaranteed under EU law, notably Articles 16 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

What distinguishes the CJEU’s reasoning is its resistance to false dichotomies. It does not require a renunciation of sports arbitration; nor does it retreat into deference. Instead, it recasts CAS not as an autonomous space insulated by Swiss procedural law, but as an adjudicative body whose awards must conform to EU public policy when they affect persons within the EU (paras. 89–91). While recourse to compulsory arbitration may serve the goal of uniform application, that goal cannot override the constitutional requirement of effective judicial protection (paras. 94-96). The CAS, situated outside the EU’s judicial architecture and lacking the capacity to make preliminary references under Article 267 TFEU, cannot serve as the terminus of legal review where EU rights are at stake (para. 125).

This analysis places RFC Seraing in jurisprudential continuity with the ECtHR’s judgments in Mutu and Pechstein v. Switzerland and the very recent Semenya v. Switzerland. In both cases, the ECtHR emphasised that the formal voluntariness of arbitration in elite sport masks coercive structural conditions. That posture is echoed in Seraing, where the CJEU held that the CAS mechanism, despite its formal appearance of consent, was effectively unilaterally imposed (paras. 92–93).

What emerges, then, is not a rejection of sports arbitration but a redefinition of its limits. The question is no longer whether private adjudication in sport is legitimate, but whether it can claim legitimacy while operating beyond the supervisory jurisdiction of courts charged with upholding fundamental rights. RFC Seraing affirms that it cannot.

This article situates RFC Seraing within the broader jurisprudence on arbitration and EU constitutional law, and argues that the decision marks a recalibration of the enforcement of arbitral awards within the EU when such awards affect rights guaranteed under EU law. It contends that the CJEU conditions recognition of CAS awards on their reviewability under Article 267 TFEU and conformity with EU public policy. While affirming the role of sports arbitration, the judgment rejects the insulated finality long conferred by Swiss-seated proceedings and invites institutional realignment within the EU framework.

The article proceeds by first analysing Seraing alongside Mutu and Pechstein and Semenya to examine its implications for arbitral finality under the CAS. Second, it considers a structural response capable of aligning the seat of CAS with the requirements of EU law set by the CJEU.

Unpacking RFC Seraing

At the centre of the RFC Seraing judgment lies a jurisprudential shift: arbitration may not derogate from the core guarantees of EU law merely because it arises from a private ordering framework or claims finality under foreign law. The CJEU’s reasoning is clear as it draws a precise boundary between legitimate regulatory autonomy and illegitimate adjudicatory insulation (paras. 85-99).

The Court holds that recourse to arbitration proceedings, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, does not, in principle, raise any objection (para. 94). However, where such arbitration proceedings have a mandatory nature, that objective of uniformity cannot justify undermining the requirement of effective judicial protection of the rights which individuals derive from EU law” (para. 95).

Even when parties have formally accepted arbitration as a condition for participating in regulated sport, they must retain access to judicial review before courts in a Member State. A national rule which confers the authority of res judicata, in the context of the recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award that has been made in another Member State or in a third country, on a decision which has not been subject to review by a court or tribunal of a Member State which is entitled to make a reference for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU, should be disapplied by the national court if that award is inconsistent with the principles and provisions which form part of EU public policy (para. 108).

This doctrinal position responds to a structural asymmetry in international sports governance. The CAS, as a private body domiciled in Switzerland and bound by the Swiss Private International Law Act, issues awards subject only to the narrow annulment criteria in Article 190(2). Among those, only subsection (e) ‘the award is incompatible with public policy’ provides a potential entry point for fundamental rights claims. However, the ECtHR has already held this threshold to be inadequate. In Semenya v. Switzerland, the ECtHR held that review by the Federal Supreme Court had not satisfied the requirement of particular rigour on account of its very restrictive interpretation of the notion of public policy. (Semenya, paras. 230–233).

Semenya further insisted on the requirement of a “particularly rigorous examination”, given the CAS’s mandatory and exclusive jurisdiction” (Semenya, paras 209, 216-217). In this context, the ECtHR acknowledged that the CAS was generally imposed on sportspersons by the governing body which exercised structural control over the international sports arbitration system (Semenya, para. 209). That coercive structure, combining formal consent with functional compulsion, directly mirrors the system scrutinised in RFC Seraing.

Earlier, in Mutu and Pechstein, the ECtHR found that one of the applicants was obliged to accept the arbitration agreement in order to be able to take part in competitions organised by the ISU (the International Skating Union) and to earn her living. She had not accepted this clause freely and in a non-equivocal manner (Mutu and Pechstein, paras. 113-115). Moreover, the Court drew attention to the institutional imbalance within the arbitral system. It noted that “the ICAS [the International Council of Arbitration for Sport] was itself entirely composed of individuals who had come from those sporting bodies, which indicated the existence of a certain link between ICAS and the organisations likely to challenge athletes in potential disputes, particularly those of a disciplinary nature” (Mutu and Pechstein, para. 154) – although on the facts this was not sufficient to find a breach of the ECHR (rather the breach was a failure to hold a public hearing).

However, it is precisely this pattern of private adjudication functionally required for participation, and structurally designed by those wielding regulatory power, that RFC Seraing targets. The CJEU offers a concrete alternative. It held that it must, in any event, remain possible for the individuals concerned by such awards to obtain a review, by a court or tribunal meeting all the requirements arising from Article 267 TFEU, as to whether such awards are consistent with the principles and provisions which form part of EU public policy (paras 99-115).That review can occur, the Court suggests, where the seat of arbitration lies within a Member State, thereby enabling national courts to exercise EU-compatible oversight (para. 125).

Finally, the Court reaffirms continuity with global arbitration law. It does not displace the New York Convention, but reinterprets it. The judgment held that although that Convention is not binding on the European Union, all the Member States and, moreover, Switzerland, are parties to it. It requires States to ensure that parties can seek review of such awards for compatibility with national public policy. For EU Member States, this includes ensuring compliance with EU public policy.

A Turning Point for CAS?

The RFC Seraing judgement essentially amounts to a doctrinal rejection of unreviewable arbitration within the EU legal space. Recognition and enforcement of CAS awards is no longer a matter of formality; it is contingent upon compatibility with the Union's judicial structure.

In proposing a functional remedy, the Court notes that arbitration procedures, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, may also be conducted in a Member State of the EU. In that case, the award made at the end of such procedures may be subject to review by a court or tribunal of that Member State which is entitled to make a reference for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU (para. 99).

This reference is not merely hypothetical. UEFA's Authorisation Rules already allow for the option of appeals to CAS panels to be seated in Dublin, Ireland. That option, long available but rarely exercised, may now become the only path to avoiding fragmentation in award enforcement across Member States. It is not thus unreasonable to suggest that there might be a shift to Dublin soon.

The practical issue, then, is if CAS continues to render awards from a non-Member State seat, such as Switzerland, any decision that implicates Charter rights or economic freedoms may trigger divergent enforcement proceedings before multiple national courts. That would mark the end of CAS as a terminal forum in cases with EU implications. The alternative, suggested by the Court, is for CAS to seat panels within a Member State of the EU, thereby allowing for judicial review within a Member State system (para. 99). In this institutional reconfiguration, CAS retains its role, but only conditionally and subject to oversight, integration, and reform.

One understanding of RFC Seraing is that it is an attempt to position the CJEU alongside the Swiss Federal Supreme Court as a potential final reviewer of CAS awards, at least within the EU. Like the ECtHR in Mutu Pechstein and Semenya, the CJEU affirms the functional necessity of compulsory sports arbitration but subjects it to enhanced judicial scrutiny, this time under the rubric of EU public policy.

The CAS, as presently structured, is institutionally indispensable yet legally unsustainable in its current form. It must reform procedurally and jurisdictionally to accommodate EU legal standards, or risk marginalisation within the European legal order.

Conclusion

The RFC Seraing judgment draws a precise constitutional limit around the recognition of arbitral awards within the EU legal order. It does not repudiate sports arbitration but affirms its continued utility while insisting that awards affecting rights guaranteed by EU law must be reviewable by courts entitled to make references under Article 267 TFEU.

The CJEU’s reference to the possibility of conducting arbitral proceedings within a Member State (para. 99) points to an institutional realignment rather than rupture. That pathway already exists in UEFA’s Authorisation Rules, which allow for appeals to CAS panels seated in Dublin, Ireland. Seated within the Union, such panels would fall under the supervisory jurisdiction of EU courts, thereby enabling compliance with the requirements of effective judicial protection outlined by the Court.

RFC Seraing thus preserves the adjudicative role of CAS but subjects it to constitutional constraints when operating within the European legal space. The outcome is not a rejection of arbitral autonomy, but its subordination to fundamental rights protections under Union law.